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Naturally	Occurring	Argument	
(Presentation	script)	
	
Sally	Jackson	
	
I	want	to	begin	my	talk	on	naturally	occurring	argument	by	looking	at	a	specimen.	It	comes	
from	a	conversation	that	occurred	during	a	meeting	of	parents	and	teachers	who	were	invited	
to	join	the	host	in	a	discussion	of	schooling.	The	host	asked	each	of	the	guests	to	introduce	
themselves	and	acknowledged	each	one.	In	the	transcript	below	you	can	see	what	happened	
when	one	of	the	guests,	Jane,	introduced	herself	as	principal	of	a	school	serving	autistic	
children.		
	
(Brackets	shown	overlapping	speech.)	
	
GUEST:			 Hi,	I’m	Jane	Guest,	and	I’m	a	principal	of	a	special-ed	center	in	Virginia,	um,	
serving	children	ages	five	through	twenty-two	um	with	autism	and	physical	
and	medically	fragile	[conditions.	
HOST:			 																																						[How	is	that	going?	
GUEST:			 Well,	[going	well	
HOST:			 											[Have	you	seen	a	big	increase	in	the	autism,	with	the	children,	a	big	
GUEST:			 =Yes,	yes.		In	fact,	our	school	has	shifted	its	population.	So	more	children	with	
autism,	definitely.	
HOST:			 So	what’s	going	on	with	autism,	when	you	look	at	the	tremendous	increases,	
really,	it’s	such	an	incredible	--	it’s	a	truly	horrible	thing	to	watch,	the-	the	
tremendous	amount	of	increase.		Do	you	have	any	idea?		You,	bu-	And	you’re	
seeing	it	in	the	school?		
GUEST:			 Yes,	I	think	--	I	mean,	I	think	the	statistics,	I	believe,	are	1	in	66,	1	in	68	
children	um	are	diagnosed	with	autism.	
HOST:			 And	now	it’s	going	to	be	even	lower	[than	that],	which	is	just	amazing.	
GUEST:			 																																																																	[Probably.]	
HOST:		 	 Well,	maybe	we	can	do	something.	
Somehow,	by	the	end	of	the	conversation,	we	want	to	say	that	the	host	has	been	pretty	
positive	about	the	tremendous	increase	in	autism.	But	at	first,	he	is	just	asking	what	Jane	has	
observed,	making	no	commitment.	Her	answer	is	equivocal.	It	isn’t	clear	whether	she	is	saying	
that	her	school	is	seeing	more	kids	with	autism	because	the	condition	itself	is	becoming	more	
common,	or	that	the	school	has	more	autistic	kids	now	because	they	shifted	their	mission.	But	
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the	host	seems	to	understand	her	as	saying	that	she	has	seen	autism	increasing	in	the	general	
population,	and	he	next	asks	whether	she	has	any	idea	why	that	is	happening.	Here,	what	he	
says	clearly	presupposes	that	autism	is	increasing—but	he	still	isn’t	really	asserting	that.	Jane	
hesitates	before	answering	with	statistics	on	what	proportion	of	children	in	the	US	are	
diagnosed	with	autism.	Jane	no	doubt	knows	that	diagnoses	of	autism	can	rise	even	if	there	has	
been	no	change	in	how	many	children	actually	have	the	condition—for	example,	if	diagnostic	
standards	change	or	if	public	awareness	rises.	So	again,	Jane’s	response	is	equivocal,	but	the	
host	takes	it	as	confirming	that	she	too	believes	that	autism	is	really	becoming	more	common.	
	
So	consider	a	few	questions	about	what	happened	in	this	talk.	Did	someone	in	this	conversation	
claim	that	autism	is	becoming	more	common?	The	host?	The	guest?	Both?	Neither?	If	someone	
did	claim	this,	where	did	that	occur?	Certainly	not	in	the	host’s	initial	question,	and	maybe	not	
in	his	followup.	And	Jane—is	she	really	in	agreement	or	just	being	agreeable?	Is	she	being	
noncommittal	on	purpose?	Or	is	she	just	confused	about	what	the	host	is	getting	at?	If	she	
doesn’t	agree	with	the	idea	that	autism	is	becoming	more	common,	why	does	she	seem	to	go	
along	with	it?		
	
By	the	time	the	host	closes	this	exchange	to	move	to	the	next	guest,	both	seem	to	be	on	the	
record	as	believing	that	autism	is	becoming	more	common,	whether	or	not	we	can	say	that	
either	or	both	actually	claimed	that	this	is	so.	
	
This	short	exchange	is	from	a	very	large	collection	of	material—tens	of	thousands	of	items--	
related	to	a	controversy	I	have	been	studying,	commonly	known	as	the	anti-vaccination	
controversy.1	For	several	decades,	stories	have	circulated	about	children	developing	symptoms	
of	autism	immediately	after	vaccination,	especially	after	getting	a	combined	vaccine	for	
measles,	mumps,	and	rubella.	There	have	been	tens	of	thousands	of	news	stories	and	editorials	
alluding	to	this	controversy,	plus	many	hundreds	of	scientific	papers	relevant	to	it,	plus	political	
conversations	about	laws	requiring	parents	to	vaccinate	their	children,	plus	court	cases	of	
various	kinds	that	have	the	link	between	vaccination	and	autism	as	a	point	of	fact,	and	of	
course	hundreds	of	thousands	of	mentions	of	all	of	these	other	things	in	social	media	posts.	The	
idea	that	autism	is	becoming	more	common	is	widespread.	But	so	is	skepticism	about	whether	
this	is	true,	and	it	is	often	claimed	that	the	apparent	increase	in	autism	is	simply	an	artifact	of	
changing	diagnostic	standards.	The	related	idea	that	vaccination	can	cause	autism	is	strongly	
denied	by	most	health	scientists.	
	
The	exchange	we’ve	been	looking	at	occurred	at	a	relatively	obscure	meeting	that	normally	
would	not	have	attracted	any	public	notice.	It	gained	publicity	when	fact-checkers	at	the	
Washington	Post	and	the	Associated	Press	called	out	the	belief	that	autism	is	becoming	more	
common	as	a	claim	made	by	the	host:	Donald	Trump,	President	of	the	United	States.2	Both	
organizations	pointed	out	that	Trump	the	candidate	had	reported	firsthand	knowledge	of	a	
child	who	became	autistic	after	vaccination.	Both	fact-checked	Trump	on	the	claim	attributed	
to	him	from	the	meeting,	and	their	fact-checking	was	consumed	and	recycled	by	countless	
other	news	organizations.	But	neither	of	the	fact-checkers	actually	seems	to	have	been	
interested	in	the	claim	itself,	since	as	I’ve	said,	the	idea	that	autism	is	increasing	very	rapidly	has	
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been	circulated	for	decades.	The	two	news	organizations	were	interested	in	the	fact	that	Trump	
made	the	claim	because	that	is	relevant	to	a	standing	concern	they	have,	for	holding	politicians	
and	government	officials	accountable	to	the	truth.	The	Post	slammed	him	with	3	pinocchios—
meaning	that	Trump	lied	about	autism	becoming	more	common,	but	not	so	egregiously	as	to	
earn	the	full	four	pinocchios	he	so	often	receives.	The	Associated	Press	was	willing	to	accept	
that	Trump	actually	believed	what	he	said,	but	faulted	him	for	having	an	opinion	without	
enough	knowledge	of	the	relevant	science.		
	
	 	
	
If	the	fact-checkers	had	not	called	attention	to	Trump’s	“listening	session”	with	teachers	and	
parents,	few	people	would	have	paid	any	attention	to	it	at	all.	But	the	Post	claimed	that	Trump	
lied,	and	the	Associated	Press	claimed	that	Trump	is	uninformed,	opening	space	for	
disagreements	with	these	claims.	In	the	few	days	after	these	fact-checking	stories	appeared,	
there	were	spikes	in	Twitter	and	Facebook	traffic	associated	with	autism,	as	well	as	spikes	in	
news	coverage.	So	the	conversation	between	Trump	and	his	guest	is	entangled	not	just	with	the	
controversy	over	childhood	vaccination,	but	also,	quite	incidentally,	with	the	question	of	
whether	Trump	is	a	fit	president.	And	what	the	fact-checkers	do	to	serve	their	own	agendas	
filters	back	out	into	the	ongoing	controversy	over	whether	autism	is	or	is	not	becoming	more	
common,	stimulating	more	conversation	about	the	topic	in	both	conventional	media	and	social	
media.	
	
This	is	naturally	occurring	argumentation—all	of	what	I’ve	just	described.	The	conversation	
between	Trump	and	Jane,	but	also	its	allusions	to	other	prior	discourse,	its	uptake	by	
journalistic	fact-checkers,	and	the	rippling	of	content	out	into	other	contexts	where	it	can	be	re-
purposed	over	and	over.	When	we	try	to	draw	analytic	boundaries	around	naturally	occurring	
argument,	we	should	not	suppose	that	the	phenomena	themselves	will	stay	within	those	
boundaries.	Naturally	occurring	argument	is	very	messy.	It	is	often	deeply	defective,	and	its	
only	corrective	is	more	argumentation.	When	we	critique	it,	we	become	part	of	it.	Although	
analysts,	including	fact-checkers,	may	see	themselves	as	outside	the	argument	looking	in,	even	
the	attribution	of	a	claim	and	a	reason	to	any	participant	is	itself	an	argumentative	move,	one	
that	can	also	be	disputed.	Donald	Trump	in	fact	often	denies	that	he	has	claimed	whatever	
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people	reconstruct	from	what	he	actually	said	or	tweeted.	Paradoxically,	some	of	the	activity	
stimulated	by	fact-checking	Trump	on	autism	was	aimed	at	stirring	people	up	to	sign	a	
change.org	petition	urging	President	Trump	to	take	a	set	of	actions	to	end	the	autism	epidemic	
that	the	fact-checkers	claimed	is	no	epidemic	at	all.	Naturally	occurring	argument	can	expand	in	
multiple	directions	at	once,	and	every	expansion	can	give	rise	to	other	expansions,	and	these	to	
still	others,	with	no	obvious	progress	toward	any	sort	of	resolution.		
	
At	its	best,	argumentation	involves	searching	out	and	evaluating	whatever	might	improve	the	
basis	for	our	beliefs	and	our	actions,	not	only	as	individual	minds	but	also	as	societies.	But	
argumentation	at	its	worst	is	also	extremely	interesting	and	even	more	worth	studying.	When	
we	look	at	very	large	bodies	of	discourse,	we	see	over	and	over	that	people	adhere	to	beliefs	
with	the	flimsiest	evidence.	But	we	also	see	that	they	can	be	surprisingly	adept	at	detecting	
flimsiness	when	motivated	to	look	for	it.	In	naturally	occurring	argument,	participants’	interest	
in	truth	is	often	highly	opportunistic,	in	that	they	care	relatively	little	about	mistakes	and	
misstatements	unless	those	mistakes	and	misstatements	can	be	called	out	to	advantage.	But	
this	sort	of	opportunism	does	not	mean	that	people	are	satisfied	with	themselves.	On	the	
contrary,	we	are	constantly	on	the	lookout	for	ways	to	improve	our	reasoning	and	arguing.	
Looking	at	argument	as	it	occurs	naturally	involves	looking	at	the	full	range	of	things	people	do	
when	arguing	and	also	noticing	the	ways	in	which	the	practice	itself	changes	over	time.		
	
For	me	and	my	close	collaborators,	the	argumentative	moves	actual	people	make	in	actual	
interaction	are	our	objects	of	study,	the	phenomena	we	want	to	understand.	Paying	close	
attention	to	the	details	of	naturally	occurring	argument	is	our	most	central	methodological	
commitment.	And	the	problems	we	choose	to	study	are	ones	that	actually	matter	in	naturally	
occurring	argument.	I	plan	to	talk	first	about	the	methodological	importance	of	paying	
attention	to	naturally	occurring	argument,	and	then,	briefly,	about	naturally	occurring	
argument	as	a	human	activity	riddled	with	unsolved	problems	in	need	of	sustained	theoretical	
attention.	
	
Naturally	occurring	argument	as	a	methodological	commitment	
	
A	methodological	commitment	to	naturally	occurring	argument	is	a	commitment	to	describing	
what	people	actually	do	when	they	argue.	Naturally	occurring	argument	includes	not	only	
arguments	within	spontaneous	conversational	interaction,	but	also	arguments	presented	in	any	
medium	and	any	context.	Naturally	occurring	argument	has	a	context,	a	purpose,	and	a	set	of	
participants.	It	can	be	observed	directly,	and	it	can	be	preserved	in	print	or	other	media	for	
further	review.		
	
Wherever	argument	occurs,	it	can	teach	us	something	about	its	own	character	and	its	own	
natural	normative	organization.		When	we	take	naturally	occurring	argument	as	our	object	of	
study,	every	context	in	which	argument	occurs	is	a	legitimate	source	of	data.	I	began	my	own	
career	as	a	researcher	studying	arguments	occurring	in	ordinary	conversation	and	I	am	ending	it	
studying	decades-long	public	health	controversies	where	the	stakes	are	high	enough	to	
motivate	huge	societal	investment	in	getting	to	the	right	conclusion.	Looking	at	naturally	
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occurring	argument	is	important	methodologically,	because	it	can	overturn	even	our	most	
closely	held	assumptions	about	argumentation’s	nature,	its	function,	and	even	its	normative	
standards.		My	colleagues	and	I	have	adopted	this	methodological	stance	because	it	forces	us	
to	see	and	consider	things	we	would	never	otherwise	have	imagined.		
	
The	central	research	activities	associated	with	this	methodological	commitment	are	(1)	
collecting	many	cases	of	argument	and	(2)	studying	them	as	closely	as	possible.	Scott	Jacobs	
and	I	began	working	on	naturally	occurring	argument	in	the	late	1970s,	choosing	ordinary	
interpersonal	conversation	as	an	initial	context	for	our	studies	(Jackson	&	Jacobs	1980;	Jacobs	&	
Jackson	1982,	1989).	We	had	become	acquainted	with	a	new	project	in	sociology	known	as	
conversation	analysis.	The	ambition	of	conversation	analysis	in	sociology	was	to	construct	a	
theoretical	account	of	social	order	from	processes	observable	in	ordinary,	mundane	human	
interaction.	One	of	the	earliest	and	most	widely	cited	achievements	of	the	sociological	
conversation	analysts	was	a	study	of	conversational	turn-taking	by	Sacks,	Schegloff,	and	
Jefferson	(1974).	This	early	study	involved	close	examination	of	detailed	transcriptions	of	
recorded	conversations,	from	which	the	authors	attempted	to	abstract	a	system	that	
participants	in	conversation	use	to	organize	the	transitions	from	one	speaker	to	another.	Scott	
and	I	adopted	the	transcribing	methods	and	the	general	approach	of	the	conversation	analysts	
to	try	to	find	the	devices	by	which	participants	initiate,	elaborate,	and	conclude	argumentative	
exchanges.	We	thought	it	possible	that	a	general	theory	of	argumentation	could	be	grounded	in	
this	most	basic	and	least	contrived	form	of	communication.	
	
Here’s	a	specimen	from	our	early	work	(Jacobs	&	Jackson	1982),	a	segment	from	a	conversation	
recorded	and	transcribed	by	one	of	Scott’s	students.	Transcribing	methods	have	improved	over	
time,	but	you	can	see	the	kind	of	detail	that	went	into	this	kind	of	work,	including	special	
devices	like	colons	to	indicate	that	a	speaker	has	stretched	a	sound	(as	in	Mar::y::).		
	
C	and	K	are	two	young	women	friends.	
C:	 Why	did	he	change	from	Catholic	to	Lutheran,	they’re	total	opposites.	
K:	 No	they’re	not,	they’re	kind	of	the	same.	
C:	 No	they	aren’t	[pause]	I’m	a	Lutheran.	
K:		 I’m	a	Catholic.	[pause]	What’s	going	on	there	[pause].	I	think	they’re	kind	of	the	same.	
[pause]	That’s	cute.	Un,	they’re	both	pretty	close,	really	Chris.	
C:	 I	don’t	think	so.	
K:	 They	both	have	ritual.	[pause]	Their	views	are	pretty	mu-	I	went	to	a	Lutheran	service	
one	time.	Well	there-	there’s	differences	bu-	
C:	 Well	Lutherans	don’t	believe-	in-	Mar::y::	you	know,	like	you	guys	do.	
	
Building	argumentation	theory	inductively	from	this	kind	of	dialogue	is	different	from	applying	
a	pre-existing	theoretical	construct	to	the	dialogue.	Either	approach	is	possible,	and	both	can	be	
valuable.	If	an	informal	logician	should	ever	consider	this	conversation	worth	analyzing,	
attention	would	likely	be	drawn	in	directions	different	from	ours.	Analytic	tasks	for	informal	
logic	include	parsing	the	talk	into	claims	and	reasons,	identifying	what	kind	of	argument	is	being	
made,	and	offering	some	appraisal	of	the	argument.	So	we	might	take	all	of	C’s	turns	and	
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reconstruct	them	as	a	series	of	propositions	and	relationships	among	them,	adding	conjectures	
as	to	how	things	that	seem	to	be	meant	as	reasons	might	be	connected	to	the	claim.	And	we	
can	do	the	same	to	reconstruct	K’s	side	of	the	argument.	
	
C’s	side:	
	
Claim:	Catholic	and	Lutheran	are	total	opposites.	
Reason	1:	I’m	Lutheran.	[Position	to	know]	
Reason	2:	Lutherans	don’t	believe	in	Mary	and	Catholics	do.	[Example	of	opposition]	
	
K’s	side:	
	
Claim:	Catholic	and	Lutheran	are	kind	of	the	same.	
Reason	1:	I’m	Catholic	&	I	went	to	a	Lutheran	service	one	time.	[Position	to	know]	
Reason	2:	They	both	have	ritual.	[Example	of	sameness]	
	
There	are	plenty	of	other	ways	to	represent	the	content	of	this	little	exchange.	A	pragma-
dialectical	approach	would	see	each	person	as	having	two	independent	lines	of	defense	for	her	
claim,	and	might	also	note	that	the	dispute	itself	involves	not	just	one	standpoint	that	is	
advanced	by	one	participant	and	challenged	by	the	other,	but	two	different	standpoints,	each	
with	its	own	supporting	argumentation.	
	
Scott	and	I	took	our	analysis	in	a	different	direction,	by	not	taking	for	granted	that	an	argument	
starts	with	a	claim	in	need	of	defense,	nor	with	any	set	of	prior	agreements.	In	this	case	and	
many	others,	we	were	struck	by	the	fact	that	neither	participant	set	out	to	prove	a	claim	to	the	
other,	but	stumbled	into	argument	when	they	encountered	trouble.	C	said	something	not	
expecting	that	K	might	disagree,	or	even	actually	take	offense.	At	a	minimum,	C	exposed	a	
belief	that	K	did	not	share	(about	Catholic	and	Lutheran	faiths).	She	may	also	have	
communicated	some	negativity	toward	Catholics	(by	making	clear	that,	as	a	Lutheran,	she	could	
not	imagine	converting	to	Catholicism).	In	any	case,	K	disagreed,	and	both	found	themselves	
needing	to	defend	their	viewpoints.		
	
There	are	things	to	notice	here	that	are	not	retained	in	the	kinds	of	reconstructions	that	focus	
on	claims	and	reasons.	To	get	a	sense	of	this,	look	at	the	fact	that	when	C	is	challenged,	she	first	
just	tries	to	assert	her	own	credibility,	and	when	K	counters,	C	shifts	to	a	different	approach.	It	
may	be	that	C	realized	that	neither	of	them	held	any	experiential	advantage,	or	it	may	be	that	C	
worried	she	might	have	offended	K.	Either	way,	there	is	no	more	elaboration	on	direct	personal	
knowledge.	Instead,	C	begins	the	search	for	a	more	promising	defense	of	her	claim	by	
considering	the	ways	in	which	the	two	religions	are	different.	On	K’s	side,	something	similar	
happens;	when	C	shows	some	level	of	commitment	to	her	claim,	K	begins	her	own	search	for	
ways	in	which	they	are	the	same.	The	specific	propositional	elements	that	get	out	into	the	
discourse—the	bits	we	pull	out	as	claims	and	reasons--are	a	product	of	the	way	each	
participant	elaborates,	extends,	and	modifies	a	stance	in	response	to	another’s	disagreement.	
These	bits	of	content	may	have	very	little	to	do	with	what	actual	grounds	each	person	had	for	
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belief	going	into	the	conversation.	Both	women	have	their	own	personal	experience	as	grounds	
for	their	beliefs,	but	may	never	have	really	interrogated	that	experience	in	any	detail.	But	both	
quickly	see	that	neither	can	discount	the	other’s	experience	while	claiming	their	own	
experience	as	evidence.	This	argument	may	be	the	first	occasion	on	which	either	of	them	have	
ever	actually	reflected	on	the	claims	they	find	themselves	defending—that	Catholic	and	
Lutheran	are	complete	opposites	or	that	Catholic	and	Lutheran	are	kind	of	the	same.	We	often	
know	things	without	having	any	reflective	awareness	of	how	we	know	it,	and	we	develop	the	
support	for	what	we	believe	when	we	have	a	reason	to	do	that.	The	way	Jacobs	and	I	have	put	
this	in	the	past	is	to	say	that	argument	drills	down	from	disagreement,	searching	for	a	path	to	
resolution	or	some	other	way	of	managing	the	disagreement.	
	
There	are	interesting	features	of	this	dialogue	that	I	don’t	have	time	to	discuss—why,	for	
example,	K	seems	to	be	trying	to	change	the	subject,	and	why	the	matter	was	dropped	after	
this	quick	exchange	of	views.	Instead,	I	want	to	give	you	a	sense	of	what	we	learned	by	looking	
at	many,	many	exchanges	of	this	kind.	Though	uninteresting	in	themselves,	conversational	
arguments	exhibit	several	important	properties	that	are	inherited	from	conversational	turn-
taking.	These	properties	were	identified	by	Sacks,	Schegloff	and	Jefferson	as	local	management,	
participant	administration,	and	interactional	emergence.	And	I	want	to	emphasize	that	these	
are	very	abstract	properties,	shared	not	only	by	conversational	turn-taking	and	conversational	
argument,	but	by	many	other	devices	for	coordinating	human	actions.	
	
Local	management,	for	the	turn-taking	system,	means	that	the	system	generates	one	turn	
transition	at	a	time	(rather	than	pre-allocating	turns	of	fixed	length	as	in	a	formal	debate).	More	
generally,	a	locally	managed	system	is	one	that	deals	with	contingencies	as	they	arise,	rather	
than	attempting	to	predefine	the	way	events	will	unfold.	For	argumentation,	local	management	
means	that	participants	make	moment-by-moment	choices	on	when	and	how	to	disagree,	and	
further,	they	count	on	others	to	do	so	as	well.	So	participants	don’t	try	to	defend	everything	
they	say,	or	to	make	sure	in	advance	that	they	can	back	up	all	of	their	assumptions,	but	instead	
go	about	their	business	assuming	that	disagreements	can	be	handled	as	they	arise.	The	way	we	
put	this	long	ago	(Jackson	&	Jacobs	1980)	was	to	describe	argument	as	disagreement-relevant	
expansion	of	speech	act	exchanges.	
	
Participant-administration	means	that	any	regulation	that	must	be	done	is	left	to	the	
participants	themselves.	They	must	enact	and	enforce	the	system	of	rules	in	their	own	conduct.	
Turn-taking	breaks	down	if	everyone	speaks	at	once,	but	only	the	participants	themselves	can	
get	back	to	an	orderly	alternation	of	speaking	turns.	Participant-administration	in	argument	
means	that	when	anything	goes	wrong	in	an	argument—for	example,	digressions	that	spin	out	
of	control—the	participants	themselves	must	put	things	right.	If	you	think	about	special	formats	
like	third	party	dispute	mediation,	there	can	be	participants	whose	only	role	is	to	try	to	keep	
things	orderly,	but	this	succeeds	only	with	the	cooperation	of	the	people	who	are	direct	parties	
to	the	dispute.	Even	in	this	kind	of	format,	the	new	configuration	of	participants	all	share	the	
responsibility	to	use	argument	itself	to	regulate	conduct	within	the	exchange	(Jacobs	et	al.,	
1989).	
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Interactional	emergence	means	that	the	overall	character	of	a	conversation	is	not	something	
planned	by	one	participant	or	another,	but	something	novel	that	results	from	how	each	
person’s	line	of	action	affects	and	is	affected	by	the	others.	An	overall	pattern	of	conversational	
dominance,	for	example,	is	not	predetermined,	and	is	not	a	consequence	of	a	single	person’s	
conduct,	but	something	that	emerges	from	how	all	participants	behave	at	transition	points.	For	
argument,	interactional	emergence	means	that	neither	participant	can	unilaterally	choose	the	
direction	for	expansion	of	content.	Everything	a	person	says	in	conversation	has	a	complicated	
disagreement	space	that	other	participants	may	choose	to	explore	or	ignore.	At	first,	Scott	and	I	
thought	that	this	disagreement	space	was	structured	by	speech	act	conditions,	but	later	on	we	
realized	that	it	is	much	less	constrained	than	that,	including	not	only	speech	act	preconditions	
but	also	other	presuppostions,	implications,	implicatures,	and	all	sorts	of	other	information	
given	off	in	interaction.	Quite	often,	a	hearers’	own	standing	concerns	will	lead	them	to	pick	up	
on	issues	that	are	simply	not	visible	in	what	has	actually	been	said	by	the	other	(Jacobs	et	al.,	
1991).	Conversational	argument	occurs	when	someone	begins	exploring	any	part	of	the	
disagreement	space	associated	with	anything	another	has	said	or	otherwise	communicated,	
and	this	is	highly	unpredictable.		
	
So	let	me	summarize	what	we	believe	about	argumentation	after	taking	seriously	all	kinds	of	
cases	of	conversational	argument—and	later,	argumentation	in	other	formats.	To	begin	with,	
argument	is	not	a	distinct	type	of	speech	act	or	a	special	activity	type.	It	is	a	system	for	
managing	a	certain	kind	of	trouble	that	can	occur	unexpectedly	anywhere	in	any	kind	of	
interaction.	Virtually	any	contribution	to	any	kind	of	exchange	can	trigger	argument.	When	
something	is	challenged,	the	buildout	of	a	defense	is	always	dependent	on	what	actual	
objections	are	raised	(not	what	objections	could	be	raised	in	principle).	When	a	weak	defense	is	
provided,	as	in	the	conversation	between	C	and	K,	further	objections	may	lead	to	an	improved	
defense.	In	naturally	occurring	argument,	a	good	argument	is	not	defined	by	the	internal	
relationships	among	one	reasoner’s	premises	and	conclusions,	but	by	responsiveness	to	specific	
disagreements	between	two	or	more	perspectives.	Because	arguers	engage	in	participant	
administration,	we	can	recover	not	only	structural	features,	but	also	normative	considerations.		
	
A	methodological	commitment	to	naturally	occurring	argument	leads	us	to	treat	disagreement	
as	central,	and	expansion	around	disagreement	as	the	basic	mechanism	through	which	
arguments	of	all	kinds	acquire	their	content.	Somehow,	a	locally-managed,	participant-
administered	system	for	the	management	of	disagreement	allows	for	the	interactional	
emergence	of	what	can,	at	some	point,	be	recognized	as	a	claim	supported	by	a	reason.	With	
some	elaboration,	this	characterization	of	conversational	argument	stands	up	fairly	well	as	we	
shift	to	other	forms	of	naturally	occurring	argument.	So,	even	when	we	shift	to	highly	technical	
debate,	it	is	disagreement	of	some	specific	kind	that	guides	the	buildout	of	reasons	for	a	
disputed	position.		
	
I	want	to	elaborate	on	this	for	the	case	of	my	current	work,	on	the	vaccination	controversy,	but	
first	I	want	to	just	note	that	in	this	work	the	methodological	commitment	to	naturally	occurring	
argument	plays	out	a	little	differently.	To	study	a	naturally	occurring	controversy	of	this	size	
and	complexity	requires	tools	other	than	transcription	and	micro-analysis.	Think	about	where	
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the	argument	occurs:	in	public	records	of	various	kinds,	in	news	reports	and	opinion	journalism,	
in	scientific	reports,	in	court	records	of	litigation	around	vaccination	injury,	and	of	course	in	
new	kinds	of	conversation	occurring	on	social	media	platforms.	Although	most	active	
contributors	to	the	controversy	are	aware	of	only	a	subset	of	all	this	material,	the	rise	of	digital	
media,	open	access,	and	algorithmic	search	means	that	it	is	accessible	to	anyone	with	enough	
motivation	and	ingenuity	to	find	it.	Making	sense	of	the	vast	amount	of	discourse	generated	
around	this	controversy	requires	new	tools--	some	people	call	them	macroscopes	(following	
Börner,	2011;	see	also	Jackson,	2013)—for	looking	at	large	amounts	of	social	data	produced	by	
large	numbers	of	people	over	large	spans	of	time.	A	macroscope	is	not	a	single	tool,	such	as	
automated	text	analysis,	but	a	combination	of	tools	that	acquire	data,	facilitate	analysis	at	very	
large	scale,	and	represent	the	data	in	some	illuminating	form.	Macroscopes	in	other	fields	are	
designed	to	handle	very	large	amounts	of	data	and	to	produce	a	very	high	level	views	of	
phenomena.	Ideally,	an	argumentation	macroscope	would	help	us	to	see,	across	long	
timespans,	how	the	shape	of	a	debate	changes	as	particular	issues	are	taken	up	and	expanded--
how	they	are	resolved	or	how	they	are	abandoned.	For	example,	tools	that	allow	for	capture	
and	analysis	of	social	media	content	can	show	us	that	after	the	fact-checking	of	Donald	Trump’s	
“claim”	about	tremendous	increase	in	autism,	there	was	a	noticeable	spike	in	twitter	and	
facebook	traffic	(as	in	this	screenshot	from	a	tool	called	Crimson	Hexagon;	similar	kinds	of	
trends	can	be	generated	with	other	tools	applied	to	more	familiar	databases	such	as	PubMed	
for	science	and	Lexis	Nexis	for	news).	
	
	
		
But	even	a	macroscopic	view	of	argument	must	also	be	capable	of	zooming	in	on	interesting	
content	like	the	conversation	between	Trump	and	Jane	that	provided	the	occasion	for	fact-
checking	and	other	discussion	that	followed.	To	deal	with	argument	as	it	occurs	naturally	in	the	
digital	age,	we	need	to	operate	at	multiple	social	scales.	We	need	to	be	able	to	shift	viewpoint	
from	individual	texts	and	exchanges	to	huge	bodies	of	previously	generated	content,	and	we	
need	to	be	able	to	talk	about	reasoning	both	at	an	individual	level	and	at	the	societal	level.	
That’s	what	I	try	to	do	with	the	vaccination	controversy:	to	see	the	decades	of	discussion	as	a	
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whole,	but	to	locate	and	look	closely	at	specific	moves	that	have	made	a	difference	to	the	
controversy.		
	
Part	of	what	there	is	to	discover	in	this	particular	controversy	is	how	argument	proceeds	in	a	
dramatically	altered	communication	ecology—because	the	controversy	started	when	the	
Internet	was	still	an	obscure	tool	for	engineers	running	over	telephone	infrastructure,	and	
steadily	adjusted	to	the	advent	of	online	communities,	the	rise	of	the	worldwide	web,	and	the	
emergence	of	social	media,	in	that	order.	I	know	that	many	people	believe	that	social	media	are	
responsible	for	the	anti-vaccination	movement,	but	that	is	demonstrably	false.	On	the	other	
hand,	the	course	of	this	particular	controversy	was	altered	by	the	rise	of	the	new	media	in	ways	
I	don’t	have	time	to	discuss	today.3	
	
The	methodological	commitment	to	naturally	occurring	argument	pays	off,	in	this	controversy,	
with	a	wealth	of	data	on	an	issue	that	will	be	more	familiar	to	most	people	at	this	conference:	
argument	involving	expertise	in	some	way.	In	this	controversy	and	others	I	have	studied	in	the	
past,	people	do	things	with	experts’	opinions	and	experts’	work	products	that	really	don’t	look	
like	forms	of	reasoning	we	feel	we	know	so	well.	We	have	plenty	of	theory	on	how	people	
decide	whether	to	believe	claims	backed	only	by	an	expert’s	opinion,	but	we	have	very	little	
theory,	if	any,	on	how	ordinary	people	try	to	change	experts’	opinions.	Does	that	asymmetry	
seem	odd	to	you?	Because	to	me,	it	seems	odder	and	odder	as	I	study	the	resourcefulness	of	
non-experts	attempting	not	only	to	evaluate	expert	opinion,	and	also	to	influence	it.	Here	is	a	
topic	where	a	commitment	to	naturally	occurring	argument	puts	us	on	a	path	entirely	different	
from	the	path	we	have	been	on	since	antiquity.		
	
In	naturally	occurring	argument,	people	do	often	face	the	problem	of	how	heavily	to	weigh	
what	experts	think	about	a	subject,	and	instructing	them	in	better	ways	of	doing	this	is	certainly	
worthwhile.	But	there	is	no	reason	in	principle	why	we	should	be	more	interested	in	how	
ordinary	people	make	sense	of	the	opinions	of	expert	than	in	how	experts	make	sense	of	the	
opinions	of	non-experts.	We	should	be	at	least	as	interested	in	how	experts	themselves	arrive	
at	opinions	that	can	be	mentioned	in	an	appeal	to	expert	opinion;	after	all,	when	a	classic	
appeal	to	expert	opinion	is	not	convincing,	one	way	of	expanding	the	argument,	to	make	it	
more	convincing,	is	to	start	excavating	what	it	was	that	led	the	expert	to	have	the	opinion.	We	
should	be	interested,	too,	in	how	non-experts	participate	in	the	shaping	of	expert	opinion.	All	of	
these	questions	arise	from	what	actually	happens	in	significant	controversies	involving	experts	
and	their	work	products.	We	need	to	start	seeing	these	phenomena	and	explore	them	as	
theoretical	puzzles	and	practical	problems.	
	
At	every	social	scale,	argument	expands	around	what	the	participants	themselves	regard	as	
issues—as	possible	points	of	disagreement.	Non-experts	can	choose	not	only	whether	to	pay	
attention	to	experts	or	not,	but	also	whether	to	engage	with	them	directly.	I	want	to	show	you	
another	specimen,	this	one	drawn	from	a	scientific	meeting	convened	by	a	government	agency	
to	create	direct	dialogue	between	health	scientists	and	citizen	activists.	The	transcript	in	this	
case	was	professionally	prepared,	along	with	all	of	the	other	presentations	and	
extemporaneous	remarks	of	the	meeting	participants.4	The	speaker	is	Mark	Blaxill—a	highly	
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committed	autism	activist	who	believes	that	the	health	science	community	is	refusing	to	look	at	
evidence	of	what	he	sees	as	an	epidemic	of	autism.	
	
I	want	to	talk	a	little	bit	about	the	burden	of	proof	on	time	trends.	I	would	make	the	
suggestion	that	given	the	increases	that	we	have	seen,	the	notion	that	the	reported	
increases	are	an	artifact	is	a	hypothesis,	and	it	is	a	testable	hypothesis.		
	
I’ll	just	take	California	as	an	example,	because	there	is	a	pretty	good	surveillance	system	
there,	better	than	other	parts	of	the	country.	A	child	born	in	California	in	the	early	1980s	
had	less	than	a	5	in	10,000	chance	of	becoming	autistic.	By	the	late	1990s,	that	rate	was	
closer	to	40	for	10,000,	so	that	is	roughly	a	10-fold	increase	in	about	15	years.		
	
The	notion	of	that	increase	being	artifactual	has	been	tested	in	a	lot	of	natural	
experiments.	There	is	a	hypothesis	of	diagnostic	substitution	that	has	been	tested	and	
falsified.	There	is	the	hypothesis	of	diagnostic	expansion,	that	somehow	we	are	
changing	the	quality	of	the	diagnoses.		
	
The	interesting	thing	about	California	is	that	the	registry	is	for	a	full	syndrome,	it	doesn’t	
include	the	broader	spectrum,	so	that	theory	of	expansion	doesn’t	hold.	The	M.I.N.D.	
Institute	has	done	a	quality	control	check	across	decades.	There	are	problems	with	
those	kinds	of	studies,	but	they	didn’t	uncover	any	different	diagnostic	quality	in	birth	
cohorts	from	the	1980s	or	the	1990s.	And	the	surveillance	system	has	been	in	place.	It	
has	changed,	any	administrative	system	changes,	but	it	has	been	in	place	since	the	
1970s,	unlike	some	of	the	educational	records	in	the	1990s.	So	the	notion	of	diagnostic	
expansion	is	not	supported.		
	
The	only	remaining	hypothesis,	or	what	I	like	to	call	the	hidden	horde	hypothesis,	that	
somehow	hundreds	if	not	thousands	of	children	escaped	the	service	systems,	and	if	we	
looked	for	25-year-old	Californian	young	men	and	women	with	autism,	we	would	find	
them	in	large	numbers	somewhere.	That	is	an	interesting	hypothesis.	I	would	suggest	
people	ought	to	prove	it	before	we	start	accepting	the	notion	that	the	increases	are	
artifactual.		
	
So	all	you	can	say	from	that	is	that	there	is	a	lot	of	evidence	that	suggests	that	in	
California	the	increases	are	real.	California,	when	you	compare	other	databases	to	the	
rest	of	the	country,	they	don’t	look	that	different,	so	again	that	is	inductive	reasoning,	
but	you	could	argue	that	is	a	pretty	useful	database	for	the	United	States.		
	
Then	I	would	ask	the	question	in	terms	of	studies,	I	think	we	should	pursue	studies	to	
clarify	uncertainties,	but	I	would	urge	us	to	consider	changing	the	burden	of	proof.	
Rather	than	saying	the	burden	of	proof	is	to	demonstrate	that	all	this	is	real,	I	would	say	
the	burden	of	proof	is	to	demonstrate	that	it	is	artifactual.		
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If	that	is	the	case,	we	ought	to	think	about	changing	our	official	narrative,	because	the	
expression	of	doubt	about	the	increases	creates	the	sense	that	we	have	a	mystery	and	a	
puzzle,	and	no	sense	of	urgency.	The	recognition	of	the	reality	changes	the	entire	
dynamic.	I	think	a	lot	of	us	are	saying	we	need	to	treat	autism	as	an	emergency,	and	that	
is	what	all	the	data	points	to.		
	
There	are	some	obvious	things	to	see	here,	but	also	some	subtle	ones.	Although	“anti-vaxxers”	
are	often	said	to	reject	science,	Blaxill	makes	clear	that	he	does	not	reject	scientific	expertise	at	
all.	He	makes	explicit	that	only	scientific	experts	can	answer	certain	kinds	of	questions,	and	that	
this	very	fact	puts	them	under	obligation	to	do	so.	He	also	shows	a	good	deal	of	sophistication	
in	understanding	how	scientists	reason.	He	calls	them	on	a	dodgy	argumentative	move,	an	
unjustified	leap	from	noticing	that	an	increase	in	autism	diagnosis	might	be	an	artifact	of	
changing	diagnostic	standards	to	asserting	that	there	has	been	no	actual	increase.	And	he	
knows	another	really	important	thing	about	scientific	opinion,	that	it	does	not	form	around	all	
matters	equally	but	around	a	set	of	matters	that	manage	to	get	on	a	discipline’s	agenda—often	
through	what	a	funding	agency	decides	is	worth	funding.	(Changing	the	agenda	was	part	of	the	
purpose	of	convening	this	meeting.)	
	
The	gist	of	Blaxill’s	objection	is	that	only	the	scientific	community	has	the	expertise	and	
institutional	resources	to	find	out	whether	autism	is	actually	increasing,	and	that	they	have	
chosen	instead	to	leave	the	question	unanswered.	He	does	not	just	decide	whether	to	accept	or	
reject	expert	opinion;	he	tries	to	get	the	experts	to	reconsider	their	opinion.	
	
This	is	not	a	singular	occurrence,	by	the	way.	I	find	something	similar	in	other	health	
controversies	I	have	examined.	In	the	1980s,	AIDS	activist	successfully	challenged	health	
scientists	on	whether	causal	reasoning	really	required	the	use	of	placebos	in	drug	trials.	In	the	
1990s,	the	George	W.	Bush	administration	challenged	the	health	science	community	on	what	
kinds	of	sex	education	programs	were	worth	investigating,	and	although	this	challenge	was	not	
successful	it	did	change	the	research	agenda	for	a	few	years.	There	is	an	unmistakable	
institutional	dimension	to	these	controversies—a	recognition	that	expertise	is	not	just	a	matter	
of	what	beliefs	experts	hold	but	a	matter	of	what	work	they	choose	to	do,	what	questions	they	
choose	to	tackle,	what	resources	they	have	that	the	public	does	not	have,	and	so	on.	These	
issues	are	actually	raised	with	some	frequency	by	intelligent	non-experts,	but	they	have	
escaped	notice	in	our	theoretical	treatments	of	argument	from	expert	opinion	as	well	as	in	
more	pedagogically	oriented	work	meant	to	train	critical	thinkers.	
	
The	basic	reason	Jacobs	and	I	committed	ourselves	to	study	of	naturally	occurring	argument	is	
that	it	forces	us	to	see	and	consider	things	we	would	never	have	imagined.	No	amount	of	
theorizing	can	substitute	for	direct	examination	of	many,	many	cases	of	actual	argumentation.	
We	can	be	as	rigorous	as	we	like	in	how	we	represent	what	goes	on	in	naturally	occurring	
argument,	but	first,	we	have	to	see	what	there	is	to	represent.	That	is	what	a	methodological	
commitment	to	naturally	occurring	argument	entails.	Careful	observation	is	as	important	as	
rigorous	theorizing,	not	only	for	describing	argument	but	also	for	saying	anything	with	
normative	or	prescriptive	force.		
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Naturally	Occurring	Argument	as	a	Human	Practice	Riddled	with	Unsolved	Problems	
	
I	want	to	shift	now	from	the	methodological	commitment	and	talk	briefly	about	the	kinds	of	
unexpected	problems	that	can	be	found	in	naturally	occurring	argument.	Perhaps	the	most	
important	reason	to	commit	ourselves	to	engagement	with	naturally	occurring	argument	is	that	
there	are	real	problems	there	to	be	noticed	and	addressed.	If	we	really	pay	attention	to	
naturally	occurring	argument,	we	notice	things	we	do	not	expect	to	see,	including	serious	
problems	we	do	not	know	how	to	handle,	problems	that	no	one	knows	how	to	handle—at	least	
not	yet.	Naturally	occurring	argument	aims	to	manage	disagreements	in	all	kinds	of	human	
endeavors,	and	it	has	developed	over	time	to	handle	more	kinds	of	disagreements	more	
effectively.	But	every	new	thing	we	learn	how	to	do	opens	risk	of	new	kinds	of	mistakes.	A	
methodological	commitment	to	naturally	occurring	argument	goes	hand-in-hand	with	a	
theoretical	commitment	to	wrestle	with	the	problems	the	practice	itself	presents.	Our	theories	
of	argument	need	to	keep	pace	with	change	in	the	object	of	study—with	change	in	the	actual	
practice	of	arguing.		
	
Right	now	naturally	occurring	argument	is	evolving	very	rapidly,	adapting	to	a	rapidly	changing	
communication	environment.	Naturally	occurring	argument,	like	all	human	communication,	is	
sensitive	to	medium,	and	changes	in	communication	technology	can	set	off	waves	of	change	in	
how	we	argue	and	how	we	reason.	I	do	not	have	time	today	to	fully	develop	this	idea	but	have	
tried	to	do	so	in	some	recent	essays	(Jackson	2015a;	Jackson	&	Lambert	2016;	Jackson	&	
Schneider,	2016).	There	is	existing	scholarship	on	how	reasoning	and	argumentation	have	
adapted	to	earlier	communication	technologies:	to	the	invention	of	writing	and,	later,	to	the	
invention	of	mechanical	printing.	We	are	only	beginning	to	see	what	consequence	global	data	
networks	and	their	computational	components	might	have	for	the	practice	of	argumentation.	
	
One	already-visible	change	in	naturally	occurring	argument	is	that	it	has	become	infused	with	
technical	inventions	and	practical	innovations,	many	of	which	are	connected	with	the	rise	of	
computational	thinking	and	information	science.	I	do	not	mean	that	everyone	in	society	has	
internalized	technical	forms	of	reasoning,	nor	that	anyone	does	so	in	every	case.	But	inventions	
and	innovations	in	reasoning	can	reset	our	standards	in	such	a	way	as	to	make	once-
respectable	forms	of	argument	obsolete.	At	the	same	time,	any	such	invention	can	introduce	
real	threats	to	reasonableness,	in	need	of	real	solutions.	The	very	changeability	of	
argumentation	is	under-theorized	at	present,	and	the	specific	changes	that	have	been	occurring	
also	need	more	notice.	
	
Let	me	explain	what	I	mean	by	inventions	and	innovations.	I	have	in	mind	any	of	the	many	
improvements	expert	fields	make	in	how	they	develop	the	support	for	conclusions.	A	large	
subclass	of	these	improvements	have	to	do	with	inference—with	figuring	out	what	may	
reasonably	be	concluded	given	a	body	of	data.	Jodi	Schneider	and	I	are	studying	some	of	these	
invented	improvements	in	inference—most	particularly	a	form	of	aggregative	reasoning	known	
as	a	Cochrane	Review.	Humanity	is	at	this	very	moment	discovering	other	new	possibilities	for	
extracting	conclusions	from	data,	often	with	machine	assistance.	We	are	delegating	more	and	
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more	reasoning	tasks	to	machines,	and	after	half	a	century	of	doing	so,	we	are	gaining	
confidence	in	the	idea	that	algorithms	can	produce	results	superior	to	human	judgment	on	a	
very	wide	range	of	perceptual	and	interpretive	tasks.	Legacy	argumentation	theory	offers	very	
little	to	guide	our	thinking	about	whether	and	under	what	conditions	these	developments	will	
improve	our	overall	capacity	for	reasonableness,	nor	on	what	threats	may	emerge.	
	
One	hopes	that	new	technologies	of	the	intellect	(including	artificial	intelligence)	will	produce	
an	improvement	in	our	collective	ability	to	reason,	but	it	is	also	possible—in	fact	probable—
that	accompanying	any	gain	will	be	an	array	of	other	consequences	that	are	neither	intended	
nor	desired.	Some	of	these	are	short-term	problems	of	adjustment	to	a	new	set	of	possibilities.	
Fake	news	takes	hold	because	there	are	still	many	people	living	who	grew	up	believing	that	
things	in	print	generally	had	authority	behind	them.	We	will	eventually	adjust	to	this	and	solve	
it	somehow.	Other	negative	consequences	represent	permanent	costs	associated	with	choosing	
one	technical	direction	over	another—for	example,	a	choice	to	invest	in	building	expert	fields	
that	are	no	longer	intelligible	to	non-experts.	We	may	or	may	not	be	able	to	find	design	
solutions	for	negative	consequences	of	our	choices,	and	the	negatives	that	remain	may	or	may	
not	be	offset	by	permanent	benefits.	We	don’t	know	any	of	that	yet,	and	we	can’t	just	assume	
that	evolution	is	the	same	as	improvement.	But	investigation	of	naturally	occurring	argument	is	
becoming	more	important	than	ever	before,	because	we	need	to	be	looking	at	what	is	new.	
Argumentation	theory	that	is	anchored	in	naturally	occurring	argument	will	be	permeable	
enough	to	recognize	new	problems	that	don’t	look	like	old	problems.	If	new	problems	are	
indeed	emerging,	argumentation	theory	will	need	new	concepts	and	methods	to	shed	light	on	
these	new	problems.	When	we	remain	methodologically	committed	to	examination	of	naturally	
occurring	argument,	these	novel	problems	smack	us	right	between	the	eyes.		
	
To	illustrate,	I	will	draw	from	conversations	a	small	group	of	us	had	on	Monday,	before	the	
conference	opened.	Dima	Mohammed	and	I	convened	this	group	to	consider	what	
argumentation	theory	might	contribute	to	understanding	a	very	troubling	turn	in	public	
discourse—a	kind	of	contempt	for	facts	or	for	those	claiming	to	argue	from	fact.	Notice	how	
entangled	this	is	with	issues	of	expertise:	What	people	interpret	as	a	contempt	for	fact	is	often	
actually	a	suspicion	of	elites	speaking	for	fact-finding	institutions.	We	need	to	understand	this	
troubling	new	turn:	to	describe	it	in	detail,	to	ask	with	as	much	objectivity	as	possible	whether	
there	is	something	wrong	with	our	legacy	ideas	about	fact.	We	need	to	imagine,	if	possible,	
ways	to	intervene	constructively,	and	to	anticipate	that	well-intentioned	interventions	like	fact-
checking	can	go	wrong.		
	
Fact-finding	institutions	are	key	participants	in	contemporary	argumentation,	but	they	are	
virtually	invisible	in	our	theorizing.	We	need	to	look	very	deeply	into	when	it	is	rational	to	invest	
our	trust	in	fact-finding	institutions	or	enterprises	that	claim	to	be	devoted	to	fact-finding.	Not	
every	such	enterprise	should	be	trusted.	And	even	those	that	should	be	trusted	often	need	
some	form	of	pushback	from	outside	to	keep	them	aware	of	the	importance	of	preserving	trust.	
The	trustworthiness	of	these	enterprises	is	a	key	line	of	critical	questioning	in	arguments	
involving	scientific	fact,	and	it	does	no	good	to	lump	all	such	questioning	together	as	denialism.	
The	trust	we	choose	to	invest	in	fact-finding	institutions	is	rationally	dependent	on	our	ability	to	
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hold	them	accountable	(Jackson	2012,	2015b).	Accountability	involves	accepting	an	obligation	
to	answer	questions	and	challenges	raised	against	one’s	conduct	and	conclusions.	Among	many	
other	pressing	problems,	argumentation	theory	should	be	working	on	how	to	support	a	healthy	
balance	of	trust	and	skepticism	toward	fact-finding	enterprises	and	fact-finding	institutions.	
	
Conclusion	
	
People	have	been	thinking	about	argument	for	millennia,	no	doubt	closely	observing	its	
practice	in	their	own	time.	Much	of	what	has	been	discovered	about	argument,	much	of	what	
has	been	invented	in	the	past,	still	makes	perfect	sense.	Some	does	not.	Because	how	we	argue	
is	changing.	How	we	arrive	at	conclusions	is	changing,	and	how	we	defend	these	conclusions	
against	criticism	is	also	changing.	We	humans	are	making	new	kinds	of	mistakes	in	our	
reasoning	as	we	invent	new	reasoning	tools	and	try	them	out,	and	if	our	field	has	an	interest	in	
improvement	of	reasoning	and	argument,	we	have	an	obligation	to	notice	both	the	advances	
that	are	being	made	and	any	new	pitfalls	we	encounter.	
	
A	commitment	to	naturally	occurring	argument	is	important	methodologically	because	it	allows	
us	to	see	what	we	do	not	expect	to	see,	including	the	very	fact	that	people	are	busily	inventing	
new	forms	of	reasoning	that	become	new	standards	for	argumentation.		Unless	we	study	
argumentation	as	it	actually	occurs,	we	will	miss	all	of	this.	
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